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DEMERIT IN MERIT REGULATION
JAMES S. MOFSKY* and ROBERT D. ToLLIsON**
Over the past fifteen or so years, the federal securities laws
have been increasingly criticized on theoretical and empirical
grounds as being more costly than beneficial to society.' For
example, the full disclosure provisions of those laws turn out
on empirical testing to generate more costs than benefits from
a social point of view.2 One key aspect of this analysis has come
to be known as the "efficient market hypothesis." That hy-
pothesis, not refuted in numerous statistical studies, maintains
that all known information about a firm is very quickly re-
flected in stock prices, well before disclosure mandated by the
securities laws occurs.' Accordingly, detailed disclosure of past
events in a firm's life are already fully reflected in current stock
prices, and knowledge of historical sequences of events is there-
fore of no value for investors in forming future expectations of
stock prices.4 Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that
mandatory financial disclosure has not reduced the amount of
fraudulent activity in the securities markets.5 Yet the cost of
generating such disclosure is indeed high.' The federal securi-
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ties laws, from the standpoint of economic analysis, have thus
created higher costs for raising capital than would exist in the
absence of such regulation, and they have not generated com-
mensurate benefits for investors either with respect to enhanc-
ing the predictability of future stock prices or in connection
with reducing fraudulent conduct by corporate operatives.
It has been argued that state securities regulation, the so-
called blue sky laws, has, like federal securities regulation, gen-
erated net costs for society.7 This argument contains several
lines of analysis, one of which is similar to that underlying
criticism of the federal securities laws. Mandatory disclosure is
required at the state level in a form similar to that required by
the federal laws. 8 Thus disclosure via the blue sky laws has
been criticized on grounds related to the efficient market hy-
pothesis. Namely, the information generated by such laws is
already reflected in stock prices and is of no benefit to inves-
tors. Additionally, state-mandated disclosure often creates in-
formation revealing nothing more than that which has already
been processed and filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the federal agency. Accordingly, it may be unnec-
essarily duplicative and wasteful
The second line of critical comment of the state securities
laws goes to the merit rules. Merit regulation is a device which
attempts to lessen the investment risks for investors in newly
promoted firms. Its proponents argue that, because there is no
seasoned market for the securities of such firms, the securities
are unduly speculative and therefore appropriate subjects for
direct government regulation going well beyond mere disclo-
sure. Merit regulation has most often taken the form of rules
regulating the maximum expenses of public offerings;' 0 requir-
ing a minimum equity investment by promoters;" regulating
the price that insiders must pay for their stock relative to the
proposed price for public investors;'" regulating securities offer-
ing prices in relation to earnings ratios;' 3 regulating the amount
7. Id.
8. See Form U-1, 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 4473 (1969).
9. Mofsky, Reform of the Florida Securities Law, 2 FLA. ST. UNiv. L. REV. 1, 15-23
(1974).
10. See discussion and citations collected in Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There
Merit In The Merit Requirements?, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 79, 87-90.
11. Id. at 103-15.
12. Id. at 90-03.
13. Id. at 95-98.
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of warrants and options granted to officers, key employees and
underwriters;' 4 establishing minimal shareholder voting
rights;' 5 and regulating interest and dividend coverage with
respect to senior securities.'"
Beyond an efficient market type of criticism, merit rules
have been criticized on the grounds that seasoned firms, not
subject to the rules, are in effect granted a comparative advan-
tage in raising capital over newly promoted ventures. Newly
promoted firms must either adjust the terms of their offerings
and their capital structures to the merit rules of particular
states or be precluded from publicly offering their securities in
those states.' 7 Some firm will thus always be at the margin
where, for financial and legal reasons, corporate promoters are
unwilling to make the adjustment, and a decision not to offer
securities in a particular state will be made.'" Of course, there
are a few states that do not have merit rules, and it has been
argued that a proposed offering could always be made there,
thus avoiding merit regulation altogether. 9 But practical con-
siderations, relating mainly to the local nature of many small
offerings, often foreclose capital formation any place except
specific areas where the firm and its promoters are well known.
There probably exists little geographic choice, based solely on
evaluation of local blue sky laws, of the place where capital can
be raised.
We do not know how many new firms fail to come into
existence because of the blue sky laws. Nor do we know the
number of offerings not made in some states but made in others
where the merit standards are less intolerable. That informa-
tion is obviously critical in assessing the costs of state securities
regulation. Unfortunately, however, regulators are more often
concerned with benefits than they are with costs. In other
words, they often focus on only one side of the equation, and if
they find some benefits, they immediately conclude that the
regulation is good. The cost side of the measurement is some-
times not even addressed as an issue. A recent study of merit
14. Id. at 93-95.
15. Id. at 98-101.
16. Id. at 101-03.
17. J. MOFSKY, supra note 6, at 41-54.
18. Id. at 36-37.
19. Goodkind, supra note 10, at 108.
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regulation in Wisconsin 0 is illustrative of this phenomenon,
and its findings, derived from highly questionable methodol-
ogy, must therefore be dismissed as unresponsive to the ques-
tion of whether merit regulation in Wisconsin has produced net
benefits.
The Wisconsin study was based on a comparison of the
performance of securities registered in Wisconsin with the per-
formance of securities denied registration there. Three indices
of performance-price, book value, and dividend distribu-
tion-were used. Based on a small sample for a highly limited
period, 1968-1971, the Wisconsin study concluded that issues
that were denied registration performed on average less well
than issues that were granted registration.2' For reasons that
will be elaborated shortly, the testing techniques used in the
study were so faulty that no such conclusion was warranted.
But it was not only methodology that flawed the Wisconsin
study. It was also marred by a priori acceptance that blue sky
regulation does not generate unintended costs for consumers
and society generally. The study gathered data with respect to
only one matter-whether investors who bought issues meeting
Wisconsin's merit rules faired better than investors who bought
issues denied registration in Wisconsin. The study nowhere
acknowledges the significance of other considerations. For ex-
ample, it can be argued quite persuasively that blue sky regula-
tion has created anticompetitive effects stemming from reduc-
tion in the number of newly organized firms.22 Some entrepre-
neurs gain more by selling their innovation to an existing firm
or, in some instances, by simply giving up a venture rather
than by complying with local securities laws. Those are not
unimportant considerations, since they are intimately related
to the amount of business competition that may exist in Wis-
consin. And competitiveness in turn surely bears on the level
of prices being paid and quality of goods and services being
consumed by Wisconsin consumers. In other words, the Wis-
consin study is lopsided. It deals solely with investor protec-
tion-the purported benefit side of the equation-and is silent
with respect to other segments of society for whom the indirect
costs of merit regulations may indeed be high. Thus while an
20. Id. at 79.
21. Id. at 111.
22. J. MOFSKY, supra note 6, at 37.
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efficient market hypothesis would indicate no benefit in such
regulations for investors, this study also fails to acknowledge
and test perceivable costs to consumers, and it cannot be
viewed as a cost-benefit analysis supporting the efficacy of
merit regulation.
Furthermore, the components of the study's empirical test
are not designed to shed any light on the issue it purports to
investigate, namely investor protection, even within a range of
tolerable imprecision. Only one index of performance used in
the study-stock price-is relevant. The other two indices
used-dividend distribution and book value-are essentially
meaningless and misleading measurements in this context.
Some firms pay dividends; others pay none at all. Some
firms pay substantial dividends relative to firm earnings; oth-
ers do not. Some pay dividends in the form of cash; others pay
in stock. The dividend behavior of a firm tells us something
about management's assessment of where earnings will find
their greatest utility-in the hands of shareholders or left in the
coffers of the firm. It also tells us something about the tastes
of investors for dividends, and how different firms in different
industries cater to those different tastes. However, dividend
distribution tells us nothing about the relative wealth of
investors. If all other factors are held constant, the payment
of a dividend will reduce the market value in a publicly traded
security by the size of the dividend.2 3 Thus a shareholder's
wealth will not be altered by a dividend payment except to the
extent a dividend may be taxable in his hands but not when
left in a corporation's undistributed earnings.
Book value also reveals little valuable information about
corporate and shareholder wealth. Generally accepted account-
ing principles contain an inherent conservative bias.24 For ex-
ample, assets must be carried at their cost or market value,
whichever is less.2 . Only under unusual and very limited cir-
cumstances may appreciated assets be written up on financial
statements to their fair market value. 26 Thus if a firm acquired
23. For example, on the so-called ex-dividend date, New York Stock Exchange
specialists adjust stock prices downward by the amount of a dividend (rounded to the
nearest i/ of a point).
24. G. BENSTON, CORPORATE FINANCIAL DisCLOSURE IN THE UK AND THE USA 1976,
at 30.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F. 2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
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assets at prices sustantially under their current fair market
value, the appreciated portion of their value cannot under
usual circumstances be reflected on a balance sheet. For an
ongoing business, the value of assets lies in the stream of earn-
ings they produce; their value is not an inherent one reflected
in accounting versions of book value. In the market, security
prices are based on a present value determination of that ex-
pected flow of earnings.Y The inherent value of assets is signifi-
cant only with respect to firms where shareholder wealth is
maximized by liquidation of assets rather than through contin-
ued operation of the firm. But even under such circumstances,
book value does not necessarily reflect liquidation value. Used
equipment sold under forced circumstances may bring consid-
erably less than the value at which it is reflected on a firm's
books. On the other hand, real estate on which the firm's plant
is located may bring considerably more than the price paid for
it sometime earlier.
Thus comparative performance of firms, based on dividend
distribution or on book value, establishes no useful information
regarding shareholder protection. Accordingly, if investor pro-
tection is to be measured by a shareholder wealth standard, the
Wisconsin study inappropriately uses book value and dividend
distribution as yardsticks. Price performance, which does re-
flect present value of future earnings, is an appropriate yard-
stick, but it is employed in a totally misleading way in this
study. The study's data were derived from three-year periods,
1968-71, 1969-72, 1970-73. In the category of price, issues de-
nied registration outperformed those registered after one year.
However, in that same category, registered issues performed
better than those denied registration after three years. The
author somehow decided, without supporting rationale, that
the particular three year periods were a better standard than
the one year time frame, and thus concluded that investors on
balance were benefited by Wisconsin's merit regulation.8
The study failed to recognize, however, that different inves-
tors have different time horizons. Some investors trade securi-
ties on a six-months basis; others after twelve months; and still
others only after longer holding periods such as three years.
Some market participants do not trade on the basis of price or
27. J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 143.
28. Goodkind, supra note 10, at 111.
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time at all, and hold securities until some external event, such
as wedding expenses or medical bills, dictate their sale. While
Wisconsin's merit rules may have benefited investors who held
for the particular three years, those rules were harmful for
someone whose time horizon was one year and for those who
withdrew from the market for other reasons after only one year.
Why is it better to protect three-year holders rather than one-
year purchasers? We can find no rational answer to that ques-
tion. However, the author of the Wisconsin study apparently
takes the position that the "true value," whatever that is, of a
security is more accurately determined over a longer (three-
year) than a shorter (one-year) period. Even if we accepted the
arbitrary standard of three years, we do not know how many
times the securities in question changed hands over this period.
It is possible that the set of investors who lost wealth on the
securities registered in Wisconsin after one year sold those se-
curities to a second generation of investors who gained wealth
on the same issues after three years. Are the regulations thus
designed to protect second and not first generation investors?
Again, even if such a question is meaningful, and it should be
clear that we do not think it is, the study is not much help in
addressing it.
We might also note that the aggregate market value com-
parisons presented by the author are meaningless. He com-
putes figures for the aggregate increase (or decrease) in market
value (the number of issues times the increase in price) for the
set of issues registered in Wisconsin and for the set denied
registration. Unfortunately, there is a problem with this proce-
dure. There were 137 issues in the sample of securities denied
registration and 211 in the sample of those registered in Wis-
consin .2 Hence, any effect of price movements on the aggregate
value of the two samples of securities is weighted by a larger
number of issues for those registered in Wisconsin-a sure, but
fallacious, way to find supporting (or unsupporting) evidence
for the requirements!
Even if some rationale could be established for the use of
three, three-year periods of comparison, one must be careful in
analyzing stock prices over the 1968-73 period as an evaluative




stock prices over this period. For example, 1968 was a particu-
larly good year for the stock market. Securities prices appre-
ciated considerably throughout the year. Speculative securi-
ties, so called "hot issues," did especially well during the 1968-
69 period of rising prices." Then in 1969, the market retreated
dramatically. For example, during 1969, the Dow Jones In-
dustrial Index lost approximately 350 points, more than one-
third of its peak value.' That index did not recover to its 1968
high until 1972, and speculative issues did not recover until
well after less speculative securities had recovered or com-
menced recovery.
Securities failing to meet state merit standards are gener-
ally regarded as being more speculative than those meeting
such standards. Indeed, the very purpose underlying the blue
sky laws is reduction of risk for purchasers of risky securities.
Since speculative securities often rise faster in an active and
rising market than do less risky ones, it would not be particu-
larly surprising to find that, in terms of price, securities denied
registration in Wisconsin outperformed those that were regis-
tered during some periods covered by the Wisconsin study sam-
ple. Furthermore, since more speculative securities often lose
ground at a rate faster than less speculative ones and since the
appreciation rate during the early stages of recovery for more
speculative securities is often lower than the rate for less specu-
lative ones, the study's price performance findings for certain
three year periods should not be surprising either. Of course,
the study offers no evidence for longer periods. If results
showed, for example, that securities denied registration and
held for, say, eight years outperformed those held for the same
time but registered, about all one could conclude is that differ-
ent time periods produce different results. In any event, periods
should have been chosen and adjustments made to compensate
adequately for spurious elements like those market factors that
probably distorted, after one-and three-year periods, the per-
formance of issues denied registrations compared to those reg-
istered. In other words, the author presents not only a badly
specified but an underspecified model.
An equally serious deficiency in methodology resulted from
30. Sowards & Mofsky, The "Hot Issue": Possible Hidden Causes, 45 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 802 (1971).
31. MOODY's HANDBOOK OF COMMON STOCKS 27a (Spring ed. 1976).
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the two groups of securities being compared. A control sample
of debt and equity securities registered was compared to all
securities denied registration during the applicable time pe-
riod. Assuming securities not meeting merit standards are in-
herently more speculative than those that do, the very struc-
ture of the study forced a comparison of groups having vastly
different degrees of risk. We are not told the specific identity
of those securities included in the control sample of registered
issues. Some securities, because of the particular industry in
which their issuers are engaged as well as for other reasons, are
significantly less speculative than other securities. In the Wis-
consin study, the degree of risk associated with the control
sample of registered securities could have been, and probably
was, so much less than that attached to the group denied regis-
tration that a comparison of performance would be meaning-
less unless adjusted for that differential. Along those same
lines, promotional firms are often expected to lose money or,
at least, generate only modest earnings in their early years,
while seasoned firms are not affected by such start-up costs.
Accordingly, a comparison of promotional firms-those denied
registration-with seasoned firms-those granted registra-
tion-for only three years cannot be expected to produce useful
information about the efficacy of merit regulation. In addition,
investors typically exhibit a wide array of risk-return prefer-
ences, and hence investors in Wisconsin who preferred rela-
tively more risky investments were discriminated against by
the regulations.
The study attempts to break down offerings according to
specific merit rules and to compare performance of firms de-
nied registration for failure to meet specific merit standards
with firms denied registration for failure to meet other merit
standards.3 2 Additionally, the study compares performance of
firms denied registration for failure to meet specific merit stan-
dards with performance of registered issues.3  This procedure,
of course, is objectionable on all the preceding grounds. More-
over, it is also not an adequate test of the independent effect
of different merit requirements. A firm failing to comply with
one merit rule often violates other merit standards. This effect
is due to the intrinsic interrelationship of several of the merit




rules themselves as well as to the relationship among capital
structure adjustments, percentage promoters' participation,
promoters' contributions, and stock prices.3 4 Accordingly, the
study's attempt to segregate performance based on violation of
specific merit standards is misleading. It offers an objectified
analysis attempting to illustrate the independent consequences
of a specific rule, when the adjustments giving rise to compli-
ance with or violation of the rule are not independent of factors
bearing directly on other merit rules.
Many businesses avoid registration in specific states be-
cause they are advised in advance of possible denial. Probabil-
ity of denial discourages registration in some states, not only
because of the direct costs involved, but also because of the
unfavorable stigma associated with merit rule violation. There-
fore, no attempt is made to register some issues in particular
states. While the Wisconsin study recognizes this problem, 35 its
results are not adjusted for it. Of course, it may not be possible
to adjust for those results. But there is no more reason to be-
lieve that such consequences result in net benefits to consum-
ers or investors than they do in net costs. Indeed it is more
likely that they cause net costs since they are bound to produce
anticompetitive effects stemming from the organization of
fewer firms.
The Wisconsin study is so methodologically flawed that it
yields no useful information on the very interesting problem it
posed. We have tried to illustrate how the model employed in
the study was badly specified. At one level, there were no rea-
sons, a priori, to believe that the model specified would yield
useful information on the costs and benefits of these regula-
tions. At another level, for the samples chosen and the time
period analyzed, no account is given by the model for other
forces that could have influenced the results. We suspect that
financial markets work in such a way as to make the net benefit
of state securities regulation nonexistent or negative. At this
point we do not have empirical evidence in hand to support this
suspicion. It should also be clear by now that we do not view
the evidence in the Wisconsin study as supporting the efficacy
of such regulation. A more useful approach would be a model
where share price was a function of various independent factors
34. These interrelationships are illustrated in J. MOFSKY, supra note 6, at 41-57.
35. Goodkind, supra note 10, at 109.
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(basically those affecting the demand for and supply of shares,
such as the expected present value of the firm), including the
independent effect of origin of registration by state. One would
then determine whether differences in state registration
requirements exert an independent effect on share prices and
hence on investor welfare. A finding, for example, that, other
things being equal, share prices are independent of the origin
of their registration would be powerful evidence of the futility
of these regulations.
To end a rather critical commentary on a more optimistic
note, we would stress that, though we find the Wisconsin study
disconcerting in its use of economic methodology, it does un-
derscore the need for a careful analysis of the costs and benefits
of state securities regulation. Such analysis is certainly in the
mainstream of law and economics and brings together the best
skills of both disciplines on a policy question of current inter-
est. More often than not, the application of the law-and-
economics approach has shown that generally accepted institu-
tions often generate more costs than benefits. As we said, how-
ever, this has yet to be done for the blue sky laws. However,
we now have on the drawing board a project, based on the
model alluded to above, that should provide some useful infor-
mation on this score.
Subsequent to submission of this article for publication,
an important new study of merit regulation has come to our
attention.3 6 For the states of South Carolina and North Caro-
lina, a sample of securities denied registration was compared
with one that was registered. The study sought to determine
whether securities in the sample denied registration generated
returns over different time periods that were different than
returns for the sample of registered securities. Computations of
returns on investment were made for holding periods of one,
two and three years, and the study found, for those periods,
that there were no statistical differences in rate of return for
the two samples.
It is interesting to note that statistical differences were
found with respect to the financial information contained in
balance sheets and income statements for the two samples. It
was based upon those differences contained in financial state-
36. R. Clifton Poole, Blue Sky Laws and the Registration of New Issues of Com-
mon Stock: An Empirical Study (an unpublished manuscript 1976).
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ments that securities commissioners applied the merit rules to
deny or permit registration. Since the financial statements of
newly promoted firms often tend to exhibit greater financial
risks than do the financial statements for more seasoned com-
panies, it should come as no surprise that the securities com-
missioners denied registration to the firms that were appar-
ently (based on the financial statements) more speculative.
However, when those securities came to market in states other
than South Carolina and North Carolina, differences in per-
formance did not occur and, on balance, returns on securities
denied registration were as high as those for securities regis-
tered. This finding is perfectly consistent with the efficient
market hypothesis, a corrolary of which is that one cannot
predict future stock prices from past financial information.
